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‘‘When the Cannons Talk, the Diplomats
Must Be Silent’’: A Danish Diplomat in
Constantinople during the Armenian
Genocide
Matthias Bjørnlund
Copenhagen, Denmark
The envoy Carl Ellis Wandel was the sole Danish diplomatic representative
in Constantinople before, during, and after World War I, and between 1914
and 1925 he wrote hundreds of detailed reports on the destruction of the
Ottoman Armenians, as well as on related subjects. This article analyzes and
contextualizes some of his most important reports, showing how these hitherto
unknown sources contribute to the understanding of vital aspects of the
Armenian Genocide, not least concerning the ongoing scholarly debate between
‘‘intentionalist’’ and ‘‘structuralist’’ interpretations of the event and concerning
the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians as a particularly radical part of a
Young Turk project of Turkification.
From the time of the Abdul Hamid massacres of 1894 to 1896—the systematic
annihilation of some 100,000 to 300,000 Ottoman Armenians,1 combined with the
forced Islamization or displacement of several hundred thousands more2—the
persecution of this Christian minority had a significant impact on a broad range of
leading public figures, as well as on the general public, in the Western world.3 This
was also true in Denmark, where public figures raised awareness of the Armenian
atrocities and their political implications through speeches, articles, books, and
organizations: secular Danish-Jewish intellectuals Georg Brandes (1842–1927) and
A˚ge Meyer Benedictsen (1866–1927) exposed the indifference of the European
governments to the sufferings of the Armenians4 and founded Danske
Armeniervenner (DA, ‘‘Danish Friends of Armenians’’), respectively, as a direct
consequence of the massacres.5 From the other end of the spectrum, bishop
and minister of cultural affairs H.V. Styhr (1838–1905), in 1897, denounced what he
called Abdul Hamid’s ‘‘holy war of extermination.’’6
Also, from 1900 onward, a number of Danish missionaries and relief workers went
to work among Ottoman Armenians, in close cooperation with German, American,
and Scandinavian colleagues, and some of these Danes became important witnesses to
the extermination of the Armenians. One such person was Karen Jeppe (1876–1935),
a schoolteacher and DA relief worker in Urfa from 1903–1919, who in 1921 became
one of three members of the Commission of Inquiry for the Protection of Women and
Children in the Near East from her base in Aleppo, Syria. This League of Nations
commission was established in 1920 to deal with the problem of the tens of thousands
of mainly Armenian women and children who had survived the genocide, many of
them only to be forcibly converted to Islam, and were still kept in captivity in the
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Turkish and Arabic areas of the former Ottoman Empire.7 Another such person
was Maria Jacobsen (1882–1960), a missionary and nurse working for Kvindelige
Missions Arbejdere (KMA, ‘‘Women Missionary Workers’’), who was stationed in
Harput (Kharpert) in the vilayet of Mamouret-ul-Aziz from the fall of 1907 until
1919. Both women witnessed every aspect of the Armenian Genocide—death marches,
massacres, starvation, resistance, forced Islamization—from their respective
geographical positions in the Ottoman Empire; and still, under these extremely
difficult conditions, they managed to save the lives of literally thousands.8 Persons like
Jacobsen and Jeppe were thus in an ideal position to give accurate accounts of
the implementation of the genocide on the local and regional levels, but when it
came to giving accounts of the overall political, economic, and ideological framework
for the genocide, no Western observers was better suited than the diplomats
in Constantinople.
A Danish Diplomat in Constantinople: Carl Ellis Wandel
At the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Denmark declared neutrality. But, the
fear among the government and the general population that Germany would occupy
some or all of the small country as a preventive measure to secure access through the
Danish straits led to the Danish neutrality policy toward Germany being declared
‘‘benevolent.’’ It also had the effect of temporarily diverting interest from matters
concerning, for instance, the plight of the Ottoman Armenian population some
2,000 miles away. But for Danes stationed in the Ottoman Empire during the war,
the organized persecution of the Armenians was a tangible reality from the very
beginning. One unknown, but important, Danish observer was Carl Ellis Wandel
(1871–1940), who made up the entire diplomatic staff of the Danish legation in
Constantinople (Istanbul) from 1914 to 1925.
Carl Ellis Wandel was born in Copenhagen and was commercially trained
as a merchant in the family wine-importing business. When he was appointed
minister (i.e., envoy) and head of the Danish legation in Constantinople in the
summer of 1914, he was already an experienced diplomat. While running the
family’s wine cork factory in Lisbon, he had served as consul general in that city from
1904–1909, and when he moved to Argentina in 1909, he went within a few years from
consul general in Buenos Aires to minister and full-time diplomat there until 1913,
when it was decided that he should be transferred to the Ottoman Empire.9 Wandel
took over the responsibility of dealing with official Danish relations from the Swedish
legation, most likely as part of a drive for Danish trade interests in an area that was
gaining increasing significance in Europe as a producer of raw materials as well as a
purchaser of Western products. Judging by the hundreds of confidential reports
he sent to the Danish foreign ministry from 1914 onward, now held in the Danish
National Archives in Copenhagen, Wandel was a thorough and conscientious diplomat,
analyzing the social and political developments in the Ottoman Empire in a
knowledgeable, usually detached, and often very detailed way, with a constant
eye to the possible effects these developments could have on Danish trade interests
in the region.
What makes Wandel an especially important and credible witness to developments
in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, including the Armenian Genocide, is
a combination of several factors. First, he was a neutral observer from a neutral
country—or, more precisely, a country whose government, not least its powerful
foreign minister, Erik Scavenius, insisted on upholding the abovementioned
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‘‘benevolent neutrality’’ toward neighboring Germany and her allies.10 Scavenius’s
general stance was to not blame anything on any of the warring parties, since he saw
the war itself as an ‘‘uncontrollable machine that crushes everything.’’11 He was
certainly not a person to let potentially ‘‘controversial’’ considerations, such as a bias
toward a persecuted minority in the Ottoman Empire, influence Danish foreign policy.
In fact, when the Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian foreign ministries, through their
respective royal courts, received an official request from the national Armenian
delegation in Paris in April 1918 to intervene on behalf of the surviving Armenians
in Armenia, who were being severely persecuted by Turkish troops following the
withdrawal of the Russian army, the apparently unanimous answer from these neutral
nations was that ‘‘nothing would be done.’’12
Second, Wandel’s status as a diplomat from a ‘‘harmless’’ country (i.e., a small,
neutral country without imperialistic ambitions) undoubtedly further enhanced his
ability to gain the trust of the large number of influential political players he had
access to. Apart from the obvious differences in economic and military strength, and
therefore in diplomatic leverage, this status is somewhat reminiscent of the status of
the United States in the Ottoman Empire before 1917.13 Also, most of Wandel’s reports
and analyses were confidential, and they were drafted with the purpose of giving
accurate and reliable information to the Danish foreign ministry, a ministry that
an experienced diplomat like Wandel is unlikely to have expected would actually be
moved to make even a symbolic gesture toward the Ottoman Armenians or, for that
matter, toward any other Ottoman minority. Neither did Wandel at any point suggest
or expect that any action should be taken in this direction. Indeed, at one point he
states in a report, ‘‘When the cannons talk, the diplomats must be silent.’’14 Unlike the
legations of other then-neutral nations, such as the United States, Greece, and
Bulgaria,15 the Danish legation does not seem to have been approached in the summer
of 1915 by Ottoman Armenian representatives seeking diplomatic intervention on
behalf of their fellow Armenians. But, Wandel agreed with his colleagues that
only Germany, as the Ottoman Empire’s most powerful ally, had the potential
to significantly influence the Young Turks, although during the genocide he came to
believe that the Young Turks had become so thoroughly radicalized that even a
forceful German intervention could no longer help the Ottoman Armenians.16
This does not mean that Wandel was indifferent to the sufferings of the
Armenians. On the contrary, as both a moral and a rational human being, he was
highly affected by the genocide and wrote extensively about it in his reports, in which
he could also, at times, point approvingly to objections raised by diplomats from other
neutral countries against the persecutions of the Armenians. In his capacity as a
diplomat, however, he adhered to strict neutrality. This was the case, when, in 1917,
he was strongly urged by the American ambassador, Abram I. Elkus, Henry
Morgenthau’s successor, to protest against the continued persecution of the Ottoman
Pontic Greeks living on the Black Sea coast. Wandel simply noted this fact in his
report to the foreign ministry, and apparently neither he nor the ministry took
any action.17
Also, even though Wandel was kept well informed of the increasing persecution
and subsequent genocide of the Armenians by his connections in, for instance, the
German, Spanish, Persian, Vatican, Dutch, American, and other embassies and
legations,18 as well as in the Ottoman Turkish establishment,19 among missionaries
from Denmark and other countries,20 and among Armenian and other Ottoman
Christian circles, his reliability as a witness is further shown by the fact that he
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was not immediately ready to think the worst of the Committee for Union and Progress
(CUP) regarding its policy toward the Armenians. During the summer of 1915, Wandel
did realize that the Young Turk dictatorship had both the desire and the means to
pursue its genocidal policy to its conclusion. But still, as shown below, it was not before
4 September of that year that he finally realized that the authorities would not stop
short of a policy of outright extermination of the Armenian population. He came to this
realization considerably later than most other Western observers, who had already
recognized and reported this fact in June or July.
Best known are the reports from well-placed contemporary diplomats, mission-
aries, and rescue workers, such as the German theologian Johannes Lepsius,21 the
German ambassador Hans von Wangenheim,22 and the American ambassador Henry
Morgenthau.23 But also the very experienced Swedish ambassador to Constantinople,
Per Gustaf August Cosswa Anckarsva¨rd, reported on 6 July 1915 that
The persecutions of the Armenians have taken on appalling proportions, and
everything is pointing toward the idea that the Young Turks have wanted to
take advantage of an opportunity where, for various reasons, no effective pressure
from the outside needs to be feared to once and for all terminate the Armenian question.
The method is simple enough and consists of the extermination of the Armenian
nation.24
This policy of extermination was a policy that, for Wandel and other observers, was not
only cruel and unjust but also irrational, since they believed that the Empire would
thus deprive itself of some of its ablest, most industrious, and best-educated citizens.25
Background and Motivation for the Genocide: Ideology and the CUP
One of the key points of disagreement in the historiography of the Armenian Genocide
concerns whether the Young Turk policy of extermination was conceived for political,
ideological, and/or economic reasons in advance of World War I or whether the actual
decision was made mainly as a consequence of (incidents and radicalization related to)
the war.26 This debate between what could be dubbed, in somewhat simplistic terms,
‘‘intentionalist’’ and ‘‘structuralist’’ interpretations is still ongoing. I will touch upon it
only briefly here, but to me there is no doubt that scholars explaining the Armenian
Genocide as the result of a mainly (but certainly not exclusively) ‘‘structural’’ process
of cumulative radicalization have provided the most convincing interpretations, by
which I mean simply that I have yet to see any truly convincing evidence that the
physical destruction of the Ottoman Armenians had been planned before the spring
or summer of 1915.27
Two things must be stated concerning this debate, however. First, it is a purely
academic debate, in the sense that the Armenian Genocide is of course a genocide
whether it was decided upon years or months before World War I28 or as late as the
spring or summer of 1915.29 The destruction was profoundly intentional as opposed to,
say, ‘‘accidental’’: real people were systematically and intentionally annihilated by
other real people, not by faceless ‘‘structural forces.’’ Second, the debate is not finished.
The matter has yet to be settled, especially since it is generally difficult, and sometimes
impossible, to decide whether increasingly genocidal actions during wars or
revolutions are mainly the results of such events, premeditated results of atrocities
committed under the cover of the events, or, as has become an increasingly more
common interpretative model within genocide studies, a ‘‘twisted road’’ (i.e., the results
of a dynamic combination of premeditation and circumstances).30 As in other cases
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of genocide, in the case of the Armenian Genocide more evidence and more sources
need to be taken into consideration.
What ‘‘structuralists’’ as well as ‘‘intentionalists’’ do agree on is that it is clear
that the radicalization of the Young Turk policy toward the non-Turkish minorities of
the Ottoman Empire began not only before the outbreak of World War I but also before
the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. As early as 1908, the year of the Young Turk
revolution, the CUP paper Tanin declared that ‘‘the Turkish nation is and will remain
the ruling nation,’’31 and in July 1910, a pro-Turkish, French-language journal based
in Saloniki, Progre`s de Salonique, wrote on the growing Japanese and Turkish
nationalist movements that ‘‘at the head of these movements will be found the peoples
belonging to the same race—the Mongolians. Each one possesses the unquestionable
title to the moral and intellectual supremacy of the great countries over which their
influence extends.’’32
That same year, at the Young Turk congress in Saloniki, it was declared outright
that the ‘‘Ottomanization’’ of the population of the empire—that is, the replacement of
(for instance) a primarily ethnic Armenian identity with an Ottoman one—could not
be achieved by persuasion but had to be achieved through forcible measures.33
And, according to the memoirs of the renowned Danish Orientalist and former rector of
the University of Copenhagen, Johannes Østrup, at least one crucially important CUP
member had simultaneously, before rising to the very top of the Young Turk hierarchy,
expressed such distrust toward the Ottoman Armenians that he had called for their
extermination. In 1937 Østrup almost casually recalls a series of business meetings
with Mehmet Talaˆt Pasha in 1910:
It had really been Talat’s plan to exterminate all of the Armenian people, and the plan
did not originate as the result of a war psychosis. I spoke with Talaˆt on several
occasions in the autumn of 1910, and among many other things we also talked about the
Armenians. ‘‘You see,’’ he said, ‘‘between us and this people there is an incompatibility
which cannot be solved in a peaceful manner; either they will completely undermine us,
or we will have to annihilate them. If I ever come to power in this country, I will use all
my might to exterminate the Armenians.’’ Six years later he fulfilled his promise; the
persecutions which were effectuated in the years of 1915 and 1916 cost—according
to the lowest counts—the lives of more than 1.5 million persons. And yet one could not
but like Talaˆt; he was a barbarian or a fanatic, whatever one wants to call it, but his
soul was free from deceit.34
It must be noted that Østrup, a conservative and a rather cynical realpolitiker
who admired Kemal Atatu¨rk as well as Talaˆt, generally had no liking for either the
Armenians or the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, sharing as he did the popular
prejudice among members of the Turkish elite,35 as well as among many European
Orientalists and other observers at the time, that these peoples were ‘‘deceiving,’’
‘‘cowardly,’’ and ‘‘mercantilist.’’ This view was opposed to that of Turks, Kurds, and/or
Arabs, who were often considered ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘rural’’ and were thought to possess a
more ‘‘warlike’’ spirit.36 Ottoman Armenians were a relatively well-educated, socially
mobile minority, and, together with the Ottoman Greeks, they made up a
comparatively large part of the empire’s small middle class. Whereas some 70–80%
of the Armenians were in fact peasants, and many Armenian city-dwellers were
relatively poor, they, like the Jews in Europe, were seen as the incarnation of the
despised, Westernized ‘‘mercantile spirit.’’ This view is illustrated in a contemporary
account of the ‘‘racial’’ characteristics of Entente prisoners in German POW camps,
in which Russian Armenians are described as being a ‘‘cunning race of merchants.’’37
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At the same time, Armenians were also seen by Turkish nationalists as hindering the
development of an ethnic Turkish mercantile class.38
But even though Ottoman Armenians were generally disliked and distrusted by
many Westerners and Muslims alike, and even though, as Johannes Østrup recalls it,
the main instigator of the Armenian Genocide desired their extermination as early as
1910, it does not follow that there was an actual Young Turk plan of genocide before
World War I. It does suggest, however, that there is some truth in the notion shared by
‘‘intentionalist’’ scholars, such as Vahakn Dadrian, that a desire to seek a thoroughly
radical solution, including extermination, to a perceived problem existed in influential
Young Turk circles even before the beginning of the Balkan Wars.39 The loss of
Ottoman territory, the massacre or forced migration of hundreds of thousands of
Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus, and the World War, with its instances
of initial Turkish defeat, Armenian resistance, and so on, were most likely among
the main events necessary to radicalize large parts of the Turkish establishment
and population to such an extent that they were willing to carry out an overtly
exterminatory policy against Armenians and other, mainly Christian, Ottoman
minorities. But, a perhaps rudimentary, but certainly radical and influential, ideology
that was just as necessary for traditional anti-Armenian sentiments to develop into
a genocidal policy did already exist before these developments, as Wandel also
points out (see below).40 As Taner Akc¸am has noted, Turkish nationalism came late
compared not only to the nationalisms of Western Europe but also to the nationalisms
of other Ottoman groups, and, like other ‘‘delayed nationalisms,’’ it was aggressive and
belligerent, determined to revive past glory and right perceived wrongs.41
Generally, whether or not one as a Western observer before World War I knew or
believed that there was a radical segment of the CUP that desired a radical solution
of the ‘‘Armenian question,’’ the official Young Turk policy of creating a multicultural
‘‘Ottoman’’ identity instead of the various more or less developed national identities
in the empire was regarded as unrealistic. Although some observers were, at least
initially, optimistic to various degrees, others were much more cautious.42 The
Norwegian KMA missionary in Mush, Bodil Biørn, though hopeful that the 1908
revolution would lead to reforms benefiting the Ottoman Armenians, was at the same
time skeptical as to how such reforms would be implemented in a world ruled by
‘‘inequality, corruption, violence, and murder.’’43 In 1932, a member of the Danish
KMA, Elise Bockelund, summed up in plain language the missionaries’ view of the
CUP revolution: ‘‘The Young Turk rule was a disappointment; they did not keep their
promises, and, though they themselves were irreligious, they still gave preference
to Islam, so the Armenians were not safe.’’44 Wandel exemplified the Young Turks’
pre-war discriminatory policies by reporting that the electoral system was designed
to discriminate heavily against Christians and that the authorities, despite their
promises, did not want to give back Anatolian land to Armenians driven away during
or after the Abdul Hamid massacres.45
A 1911 report from the Danish embassy in Rome analyzing the ongoing uprising
in the Muslim Ottoman province of Albania points out that, in spite of the promises
and stated ambitions of the Young Turks, there was a fundamental discrepancy
between those ambitions and the political and ethnic realities of the Empire. According
to the report, well-informed observers did not believe that the Young Turks would
succeed in ‘‘fusing the various, differing elements of the population in the vast, loosely
connected Turkish Empire into a truly Turkish nation,’’46 a view fully shared by
the contemporary Turkist ideologist Yusuf Akc¸ura.47 All the recent changes made by
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the Young Turks, which cut deeply into what the anonymous author(s) of the report
describe as ‘‘the century-old habits of a completely immature population,’’ would only
bring confusion and rebellion throughout the empire.48 In 1913, after the coup by the
Triumvirate, the British foreign ministry even predicted that one of the consequences
would be widespread massacres of Ottoman Armenians.49 There was a sense that
the perceived problems with the non-Turkish national and religious minorities of the
Ottoman Empire would eventually be ‘‘solved’’ in a violent manner.50 The question was
when and how this ‘‘solution’’ would come about.
Background and Motivation for the Genocide According to Wandel
The most well-placed Danish observer of high-level Young Turk policy, Carl Ellis
Wandel, tried in September 1915 to analyze how the Young Turk ideology had evolved
from seemingly democratic Ottomanism to the current mix of xenophobia and extreme
nationalism, a change he believed was partly ideologically and economically driven
and, partly dictated by circumstances:
The CUP took the reins of power with a motto saying ‘‘equal rights for all Ottoman
citizens.’’ But to create the unity mentioned in the title of the Committee in the vast and
ethnically diverse Empire, there had to be created a sense of Ottoman solidarity that
included all the peoples of the Empire, while simultaneously guarantees had to be
created that this new ‘‘Ottomanism’’ would also in the future be led by Young Turk
members of the Committee; that is, at the same time creating equal rights for all
Ottoman citizens, without regard to nationality and religion (the idealistic demands of
the revolution), and making sure that this new Ottomanism would still be a purely
Turkish movement. The struggle between these two demands lasted a while, until the
Committee, immediately after the end of the Balkan War, resolutely discarded the first
demand (equal rights for all Ottomans) and decided to pursue the road of Turkification,
the road characterized by the boycott in the spring of 1914 that struck Greeks who were
Ottoman subjects as well as Greek subjects, the simultaneous persecutions of Greeks in
Asia Minor and Thrace, and, later that year, favoured by the World War and the
subsequent annulment of the Capitulations [and] the declaration of Jihad—with
German assistance—[Turkification] finally led to the xenophobic and nationalist
policy, the recent consequences whereof I have several times closely examined, and
which at the moment has as its main purpose the extermination of the Armenian
population in the Empire.51
In the months after the 1913 coup, the new, more radical Young Turk leadership
did try to give the appearance of continuing efforts to ‘‘Ottomanize’’ and centralize
the empire in a peaceful and democratic manner. But, as Wandel and other observers
have noted, if this had ever in reality been CUP policy, such was no longer the case.52
In fact, as Feroz Ahmad has put it, ‘‘repression and violence became the order
of the day.’’53 This process of radicalization Wandel considered so vital and intriguing
that he made it the theme of a number of further reports. But, though he
acknowledged that the extent of the radicalization was partly caused by events
outside the control of the CUP, he also emphasized that radicalization was not simply
the result of various defensive ad hoc measures against, say, Western imperialism, but
was in fact an integral part of an active, deliberate policy, rooted in pre-revolutionary
Turkist supremacist beliefs, whose basic goal was the preservation of power.
Since it was no longer believed that this goal could be reached by a multiethnic,
multireligious, Turkish-dominated union, it would be reached by somehow creating
a ‘‘Turkey for the Turks,’’ economically, politically, linguistically, and ethnically,
increasingly combined with the more expansionist Pan-Turkist vision of Turan,
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a Turkish Empire uniting ethnic Turks from all over Asia and Russia.54 In a report
from 22 September 1915, Wandel accordingly describes the nature of the CUP by
describing the members of the CUP
not as great idealists or founding statesmen but as organizers using every means to
further their organization .. . . It is not the ideals, but the frame, that is, the power, that
they have fought and are fighting for . . .. For some there is no doubt about their
integrity, but it is the general understanding that [the CUP] will continue to pursue the
policy it has already initiated, a policy which has led to so many conflicts.
Wandel believed, mistakenly, that this policy would eventually lead to ‘‘national
suicide.’’55 In fact, though the costs were immense, it was an important initial step
leading to the creation of the relatively homogeneous, if unstable, nation-state that is
the modern Turkish Republic.56
But, as Wandel also emphasized, even though the Young Turks generally were
not ‘‘great idealists,’’ they did share some broad ideals—ideals that, if nothing else,
served to legitimize their own power monopoly in particular, and the power monopoly
of ethnic Turks in general, as well as serving to secure the centralization and
homogenization of a disintegrating empire.57 The nation, beginning with the areas
of trade and language, was to be cleansed from what were deemed to be ‘‘foreign
elements’’ in order to establish the desired national culture and economy.58 Thus
began the systematic, still ongoing process of nation building by marginalizing or
destroying the non-Turkish components of, first and foremost, the age-old Anatolian
multicultural make-up, a process that required both the rewriting of history and the
definition of non-Turks as the ‘‘Other.’’59
In a lengthy report from January 1915, titled ‘‘Political Events in Turkey in 1914,’’
Wandel describes how it was only after the Young Turk dictatorship had come to power
that one could see Turkish shops in Constantinople advertising that ‘‘This Is a Muslim
Business.’’60 The fact that, according to the Danish diplomat, the Armenians and
Greeks of the Ottoman Empire were at this point generally wary but loyal even toward
a dictatorship made no difference. Already on 24 July 1914, Wandel had reported
that ‘‘the Christian electorate is generally opposed to the CUP’s favored system of
centralization and to the principle ‘Turkey for the Turks,’ but when it comes to
improving their living conditions, they see it as necessary to work with the Committee,
rather than to break with it.’’61 This despite the fact that the Christians of the empire
were subjected to what Wandel describes as a repressive and xenophobic regime that
systematically discriminated against them.62
On 6 December 1915, Wandel elaborated on how the CUP elite and Turkish
intellectuals had increasingly become radical nationalists. Apart from pointing to
the genocide itself, his report exemplifies this by mentioning the preceeding
attempted ‘‘cleansing’’ of Greeks from Western Anatolia and of Greeks and
Armenians from politics and trade; the government-controlled, xenophobic press; the
nationalist schools’’ and the ban on street signs and so on written in ‘‘foreign,’’ that is,
non-Turkish, languages.63 Wandel refers in this report to an article in the Turkish
daily Tesfiri Efkiar from 11 November 1915, which emphasized that
the Turkish language is the foundation of our national development. At the moment we
are engaged in a war for our very existence, and the first result of this victorious war
ought to be that it is confirmed that the Turkish language reigns supreme in Turkey.64
Furthermore, in what Wandel dubbed the ‘‘Germanized-chauvinistic’’ Turkish
press, Armenians were often described as ‘‘greedy exploiters’’ by journalists
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who willingly participated in the forefront of the regime’s xenophobic campaign.65
One such example was Agaoglu Ahmed Bey, the editor of the French-language Young
Turk daily Hilal, which functioned mainly as a propaganda organ in the West, as well
as among Westerners in the Ottoman Empire. Ahmed Bey, who had ‘‘Turkified’’ his
name Ahmed Agaieff, thus hiding his Azeri (Tatar) background, was a Turkist
ideologist who, according to Wandel, had long been known for his extreme hatred
of Armenians as one of the organizers of massacres of Armenians in the Caucasus in
1905.66 Leading Young Turks even went so far as to openly describe Armenians and
other Ottoman Christians as ‘‘tumors,’’ a cancer that had to be removed so that the
Turkish nation could be ‘‘cured.’’67
For Wandel, as well as for other observers, it was obvious that the economic and
linguistic discrimination, together with other official discriminatory and repressive
initiatives, created a society without room for opposition or minorities. These
initiatives included the establishment of a nationwide, Turkish-nationalist, militarized
‘‘scout movement’’; the establishment of ethnic Turkish transport and trade
companies; and the calling out of Turkish schoolchildren and workers to celebrate
newly created national (i.e., exclusively Turkish) commemoration days and
celebrations.68 Although Wandel was rightfully doubtful whether these ‘‘nation-
building’’ initiatives actually had any significant impact on the general population, for
the Young Turks this whole process, and its acceleration during the war, was part of
the Turkish people’s ‘‘wonderful awakening, which the government has long been
struggling to bring about, and which had to come sooner or later, but which has
now been accelerated by the war,’’ as the otherwise moderate vali of Adrianople
(Edirne), Hadji Adil Bey, expressed it in a speech given in his capacity as speaker at
the opening of parliamentary sessions in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in
November 1916.69
The deliberate and ‘‘rational’’ nature of this Young Turk nationalist ideology
was also clearly expressed by the experienced diplomat Djevad Bey, Turkish minister
to Copenhagen and a diplomate de carrie`re with close connections to the Young
Turk government. In an interview given to leading Danish newspaper Politiken in
February 1916, he stated that
We have now introduced the Turkish language in Turkey. This is the first result
of a national awakening: Turkey for the Turks . . .. When we change old signs and
street names, our enemies claim that we tear down the European inscriptions
out of hatred and malice. There is no truth in that. We only do what all nations
have done before us. They call us chauvinists and rebels. I assure you, we only want one
thing: our economical and political independence. This we all agree upon. There are
no longer both old and young Turks. There are only Turks. And during the war we
are all young.70
Paradoxically, chauvinist Turks had come to believe that in order to become truly
‘‘European’’—perceived as being effective, competitive, homogenic, assertive, powerful,
expansive, rich, modern, and so on—they must eliminate the perceived European
elements of the Empire, that is, the Ottoman Christians, who had become an obstacle
to reaching this goal. The fact that, by targeting Christians, the Young Turks also
pleased the conservative, Islamist opposition was, according to Wandel, another, more
opportunistic reason for this policy.71
It is contested whether the ideology of a ‘‘Turkey for the Turks’’ can be directly
related to the subsequent ‘‘cleansing’’ and massacre of Ottoman Armenians and
other minorities, or whether the Armenian Genocide in particular was, rather,
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a ‘‘perverse and extreme security measure based in an ethnoreligious framing,’’
as Ronald Grigor Suny expresses it.72 To me, first, these explanations are not
mutually exclusive; rather, they complement each other, showing the ‘‘twisted’’
(i.e., ideological and deliberate as well as circumstantial and opportunistic) nature
of the Armenian Genocide. Second, the reports Wandel sent to his superiors in
Copenhagen help underline that no matter the circumstances, the extremely
chauvinist ideology of the Young Turks was a main reason that, from the outbreak
of World War I, the Armenians immediately and violently came to be ‘‘ethno-
religiously framed.’’ Because of the paranoid fear expressed by Talaˆt that the
Armenians as former allies knew, and therefore could destroy, the Young Turk
organization, and the fact that many Armenians lived near the front lines in Eastern
Anatolia, Armenians were perceived, both before and during the war, to be the most
dangerous internal threat.73
The war itself was most likely a crucial factor leading to the decision in favor
of genocide, as it gave rise to both the opportunity of ‘‘settling scores’’ and the need
for a scapegoat to divert criticism for the initial losses of the Ottoman army. The war
also resulted in atrocities against Muslim civilians, as well as in scattered Ottoman
Armenian nationalist activity and resistance that, through official campaigns
of propaganda and misinformation, served to further legitimize, brutalize, and
dehumanize. In 1915, if not before, the Turkish national identity was influenced
by the loss of territory and prestige to an extent that resulted in a willingness to use
exterminatory measures against those societal groups who were now thought to be
threatening not only the traditional hegemony of ethnic Turks but the very survival
of the Turkish nation.74 This Young Turk ‘‘siege mentality’’ was heightened by
the fact that Turks were themselves still a minority among minorities—the Kurds,
Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Jews, Circassians, and other groups of the
Ottoman Empire.
But the cleansing from Ottoman soil of Armenians became not only a goal in itself
but also an integral part of a grand project to create a Turkish nation. The regime
initiated the above-mentioned simultaneous measures (‘‘national holidays,’’ etc.) aimed
at imprinting a Turkish national identity upon the large majority of the Turkish
population that had traditionally identified themselves mainly along (ethno-)religious
lines.75 But the removal of potential challenges to Turkish hegemony was believed to
be a precondition for these ‘‘positive’’ measures to succeed, as expressed by Wandel in
March 1916:
If the Young Turks have their way, the time will never come back when the Arabs,
Armenians, and Greeks made up the majority in the Ottoman parliament, because they
realize that such a majority sooner or later would demand that the Caliphate be
replaced by a confederation, and that they would soon lose their power. The Turks have
therefore chosen the only means available to them to preserve their control over
Turkey—which is the complete extermination of the peoples who had the greatest
possibilities to evolve after the introduction of the constitution, and with whom they
have no way of competing in a peaceful struggle.76
The Persecution of the Ottoman Greeks in 1914: The Beginnings
of Violent Turkification
Before the outright exterminatory policies of World War I were initiated, the first
attempts at violently homogenizing the ethnic and religious make-up of Anatolia
had already begun. In the spring and summer of 1914, when attempts at removing
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non-Turkish influences from the Ottoman economy had just been initiated in
earnest, this policy was supplemented with the ‘‘cleansing’’ and massacre of more
than 100,000 ethnic Ionian Greeks from the Aegean region.77 This was the result of
careful deliberations and preliminary research by the CUP, accompanied by a decision
to hide the connection between the government and the Special Organization, the
organization in charge of the operation.78 This conclusion is confirmed by a June 1914
report to Wandel from the Danish consul in Smyrna (Izmir), Alfred van der Zee, that a
large-scale, systematic, and violent banishing of what he, Van der Zee, describes as the
generally very peaceful Greek population was carried out on the orders of the central
government.79
According to Van der Zee, in March 1914, the valis of Smyrna and the nearby
regions had made tours of inspection to the coastal towns and villages of the vilayets,
‘‘advising’’ the local civil servants to force the Greek population out, first by economic
boycotts, then, when this did not have the desired effect, by violent persecution:
‘‘Armed ‘bashibozuks’ [Turkish irregular troops] attacked the Greek population,
raped the Greek women, killed the children, etc. Finally, the gangs also violated
non-Ottoman citizens.’’80 These bashibozuks, alternatively called ‘‘Turkish gangs’’
in the reports, numbered 8,000 to 10,000 in the vilayet of Aidin (Smyrna) alone and
were financed and run by the state. Many of these gangs consisted of members of
the Special Organization and/or Muslim refugees from the Balkans or the Caucasus,
the so-called muhadjirs, who, according to Wandel, carried out the persecutions,
plundering and murdering ‘‘as many of the hated Greeks as possible.’’81 Aside
from economic, ethnic, and political motives, there was a military rationale behind
this policy, in the sense that the Young Turk government wanted to prevent
the Greeks along the coastline from eventually becoming as a fifth column, a
danger believed to be particularly imminent because Greece had come to control
the nearby islands of Chios and Mytilene, which, it was claimed, could be used
to launch attacks.82
Despite attempts to keep this policy a secret, and despite attempts to
deny both the existence of and the responsibility for the policy, the Young Turk
government soon had to change course, facing pressure from, especially, the French
government. The Young Turks were also aware that they were not ready for the
war with Greece that would most likely result if the persecutions did not stop.83
But after consultations with the Austrio-Hungarian ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire, Count Johann Pallavicini, Wandel was convinced that a war between
Greece and the Ottoman Empire was bound to break out soon and that the Greek
population of Anatolia would then ‘‘be worse off than ever before.’’84 This prediction
was accurate, since, during World War I, the persecutions of the Ottoman Greeks
were taken up again on a regular basis, sometimes on German initiative, and
hundreds of thousands of Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace, including the Pontic
Greeks from the Black Sea coast, were either killed or expelled from 1914 through
1918. In June 1917, too, Greece did join the war against the Ottoman Empire and
her allies.85
In 1914, the aim of this policy was most likely not to exterminate but, as it has been
put, to ‘‘thin out’’ (and thereby significantly weaken) the Ottoman Greek population,
as an extension of the policy of economic and cultural Turkification, while at the same
time creating living space for the muhadjirs.86 This policy was, as stated above,
not only economically but also politically and ideologically motivated. Whatever the
rationale, it was a cruel and murderous policy. As Wandel expressed it, the losses
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resulting from the persecutions were obviously irreparable, since ‘‘an industrious
class of people have been expelled, despite the fact that the province was
already thinly populated. It can be predicted that the province will suffer from the
results of this failed policy for years to come.’’87 But the practical experiences, the
impunity of the perpetrators, and the relative political ‘‘success’’ of the persecutions—
thousands of Greeks fleeing in terror, leaving their homes and possessions to be
taken over by Muslim refugees88—meant that even more radical and violent measures
during World War I could be seen as not only possible but also as yet another
extension of a policy of ‘‘social engineering’’ already decided upon. Besides, as Talaˆt
told Morgenthau during the Armenian Genocide, ‘‘We care nothing about the
commercial loss.’’89
For the Young Turks, one of the major advantages of such a policy of
homogenization was that the Western powers, particularly Britain and Russia,
would be presented with a fait accompli, in that the mainly Christian groups would be
gone, groups that historically had served as an excuse for these powers to interfere
with what the Young Turks regarded as the internal matters of the Ottoman Empire.
The persecutions of the Greek minority from 1914 onward therefore point toward
an actual policy of extermination, if not in the sense that these policies were planned to
be continuous parts of a ‘‘grand scheme’’ of partial and total genocides (see note 86),
then certainly in the sense that both policies were the result of xenophobic
deliberations that were inherently genocidal and in the sense that the two
policies were closely connected, ideologically, politically, and bureaucratically.90
This connection is perhaps most strikingly personified by the decidedly racist
founding member of the CUP, Dr. Mehmed Res¸id. In 1914, as mutasarrif (governor)
of the sub-province Karesi in the province of Balikesir, he was heavily involved with
the persecution of the Aegean Greeks, while as vali of Diyarbekir he was responsible
for the extermination of the Armenians and Assyrians in that region in 1915
and 1916.91
With respect to the developing Young Turk policy of denial, official reactions
to the 1914 persecutions also point forward toward a vital aspect of the early denial
of the Armenian Genocide—the claim from Constantinople that the central
government, when it came to outright killings, had no control of the regional
governments or of the designated killer gangs. The interior minister, Talaˆt Pasha
himself, declared in June 1914 that the occurence of what he called ‘‘regrettable
incidents’’ in the Smyrna region was because ‘‘many Turkish civil servants in the
provinces still believe that the orders they receive from the imperial government
in Constantinople [to protect the Greek population] have been issued under
pressure from the Great Powers, and therefore not issued in earnest.’’92 Therefore,
according to Talaˆt, all responsibility for wrongdoing rested with the vali of Smyrna.
The interior minister even went on what Van der Zee calls a farcical tour of the
Smyrna region, traveling from city to city, making speeches promising ‘‘complete
security,’’ while the local Greeks had to stay at home, day and night, to avoid
being beaten up or shot.93
There are clear indications that while the persecutions of the Ottoman Greeks was
the first major step toward the ethnic, religious, and economic Turkification of the
Empire, and the genocide of the Armenians the most important and radical such step,
other steps were planned or desired—for instance, concerning the Ottoman Jewish
minority. By December 1914, hundreds of Jews had been deported from Jaffa in
Palestine to Egypt before this particular operation was stopped because of concerted
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protests from ambassadors Morgenthau and Wangenheim. It is believed that
the Ottoman authorities generally distinguished between Jewish nationalists
and the general Jewish population, perhaps as a result of such external pressure.94
But Wandel and other observers, including some Ottoman Jews, were convinced that
the process of Turkification was meant by the Young Turks to be total. For instance,
on 16 November 1915, Welsh MP Aneurin Williams stated during a parliamentary
debate on what was called ‘‘the Armenian atrocities’’ that ‘‘it is not only Christians.
Apparently this process of exterminating all the progressive elements of the country—
what is called Ottomanising the country—extends far beyond the Christians. The
Zionist Jews, for some reason, have been suspected of being an enlightening force, and
they, too, have been in terror.’’95 Similarly, Wandel stated that ‘‘the goal of the Zionist
movement can . . . hardly be reconciled with the policy of the present Turkish
government, which aims at removing from Turkey all foreign elements.’’96 It was
feared that the policies of extermination and/or deportation would, if unchecked,
sooner or later come to include the Ottoman Jews, even though, according to Wandel,
this group was generally known to be particularly ‘‘well integrated’’ into the Turkish-
dominated Ottoman society.97
The massive deportations of Ottoman Kurds in 1916–1917 are yet another
indication that the ideology of a ‘‘Turkey for the Turks’’ was to be realized to the fullest
possible extent and that the homogenization of Anatolia was the result of a bold,
criminal, highly organized, and deliberate policy. Though there are many examples
showing that, during the genocide, Kurdish tribes and individuals (as well as many
other Muslims) did help Armenians hide or escape from the Turkish authorities,98
generally, Kurdish militias and villagers played a significant role as executors of the
genocide. But when the vast majority of the Armenians had been cleansed from
Anatolia, the Young Turks began concentrating on what they regarded as the no less
troublesome Kurds.
Since it was believed that it was generally possible to assimilate Muslim
minorities,99 the Kurds were not systematically massacred but, rather, were deported
to the western parts of Anatolia to be forcibly assimilated among ethnic Turks, who
now began to constitute the majority in cities and regions, quite often thanks to the
‘‘disappearance’’ of the Ottoman Christians. Still, tens of thousands of Kurds were
killed outright, and hundreds of thousands died of diseases and starvation100 and they
were not the only Muslim Ottoman citizens being persecuted. In 1918, George
E. White, in an article titled ‘‘Some Non-conforming Turks,’’ wrote that
Those rumors of impending events in Turkey, which anticipated the deportation of
Armenians and similar treatment for the Greeks and other Christians of the Empire,
carried the foreboding that the next step taken by the governing clique would force
the Alevi Turks to abandon their Moslem nonconformity. The purpose of the ‘‘Party of
Union and Progress’’ is alleged to be to create a uniform state, one in Turkish
nationality, and one in Moslem orthodoxy.101
From Persecution to Total Genocide: The Report
of 4 September 1915
Back in August 1915, as shown above, Wandel was still hoping that the CUP would not
remain what he considered to be so daring and irrational as to take its chauvinist
and xenophobic policy—the massacres and persecution, the forced conversions
to Islam, and so on, which it pursued, as Wandel stated, under the pretext of
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‘‘military necessity’’102—to its final conclusion, which would be the extermination of
the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire:
In my earlier reports, it has already been stated how the Young Turk government, with
the aim of strengthening its position internally, lately has made xenophobia and hatred
toward Christians a leading principle in its policy . . .. The aim of this policy is to force
foreigners and Christians to leave the country by making their existence in Turkey
intolerable, thereby at the same time satisfying the fanaticism that has become an asset
for the government, but it is of course not possible to speak of the rational completion of
this policy, at least not concerning the Greeks . . .. For Turkey’s own sake it is probably
about time that the persecutions are stopped. The fanatical Committee complains
that there is no patriotism in Constantinople, which it wants to transform into a
Turkish-Muslim capital, but it does not seem to realize that it makes a big mistake
in driving out the foreigners and the Christians, even seen from an academic point of
view, since it thereby drives out the entire intelligence of the country, the entire part
of the population that is in possession of spirit, insight, and means, the businessmen,
the scientists and the financiers, and that, if the principle of ‘‘Turkey for the Turks’’ is
to be carried through, there will be nothing but civil servants and peasants in
the country.103
But on 4 September 1915, less than three weeks after he had expressed his almost
desperate hope that the CUP would stop short of outright extermination, Wandel for
the first time informed his superiors in the Danish foreign ministry that a genocide
was indeed taking place:
I will briefly allow myself to give an account of the important and sad information
regarding the latest developments that has been given to me by a completely
trustworthy and truthful source, and which is of such a nature that it will be regretted
everywhere in the Christian world. The Turks are vigorously carrying out their cruel
intent, to exterminate the Armenian people.104
This was not just a statement. Wandel backed it up by giving numerous examples of
the nationwide ‘‘evacuation’’ of Armenians, a euphemistic expression that, he
emphasized, meant almost certain death by organized massacres and deprivation.105
For example, Wandel had received a letter from the Armenian Catholic bishop of
Erzerum, Joseph Melchisedechian, who informed him that the parish of Khodirtchour,
which consisted of twelve villages, had been completely evacuated, and that no one
knew what had happened to the vanished Armenian population.106 The Armenian
Catholic bishop of Harput, Stepan Israelian, had on 23 June informed the Patriarchate
that he had received orders to leave the city for Aleppo with the whole of his
congregation within twenty-four hours. Later it was discovered that Israelian and
approximately 1,700 other Armenians had been attacked and killed on the road
between Diyarbekir and Urfa.107 Wandel’s report furthermore mentions that the
archbishop of Mardin, Ignatius Maloyan, had been killed, together with approximately
700 Catholics from the congregation; that the Catholic population of Tel Armen had
been wiped out completely; that the cities of Tarsus, Hedzin (Hadjin), Mersina
(Mersin), and many others had been ‘‘completely evacuated’’; and that Armenian
women of Angora (Ankara) had been forcibly married to Muslims, while approximately
6,000 deported men, among them seventy clergy led by Bishop Gregoire Bahaban, had
been shot.108 In that same report, Wandel states that ‘‘even here in Constantinople
Armenians are kidnapped and sent to Asia, and it is not possible to get information of
their whereabouts.’’109 He ends the report by concluding that ‘‘the fate that has
befallen the Catholic Armenians has with even greater cruelty befallen all other
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Armenians, as the intention of the government, as I already have had the honour to
report, is to completely annihilate the Armenian people.’’110
As for the significance to the extermination project of the question of ‘‘Armenian
loyalty’’—in itself a rather meaningless phrase, since it implies some sort of general
Armenian organization, mindset, and pattern of actions that did not exist—according
to Wandel, it did not change significantly for the general Ottoman Armenian
population after the empire entered World War I by attacking Russia and began to
deport and massacre Armenians. In any case, as Wandel also pointed out, the question
of ‘‘loyalty’’ had little, if anything, to do with the persecution of the Armenians, since,
as his 4 September report emphasizes, the persecutions at this point took place with no
regard to whether the targeted Armenians could even theoretically be construed to
constitute any real threat to the Ottoman Empire. After having stated that the
slaughter of the Armenians continued ‘‘with great intensity,’’ in spite of promises to the
contrary that he and other diplomats had personally received from the Young Turk
government, Wandel mentions that even the Armenian Catholics, who, he states,
never had any political aspirations, and the Gregorian Armenians, ‘‘who have
distanced themselves from nationalist ideas to such an extent that they have given
up their mother tongue and adopted the Turkish language as their own,’’ were still
subjected to ‘‘the most stubborn persecution.’’111
The Economy of Genocide: The ‘‘Confiscations’’
of Armenian Property
Another central aspect of the genocide, the ‘‘legal’’ background for the deportation
of the Armenians and the confiscation of Armenian assets by the Young Turk
government, was also analyzed by Wandel. On 27 May 1915, only three days after
the Entente had threatened to hold Turkish civilians and military personnel
responsible for ‘‘crimes against humanity,’’ the CUP rushed the passing of a law
that basically gave the authorities carte blanche to deport any person they wanted.112
The authorities, Wandel emphasized, had only to ‘‘sense’’ treason to justify the
deportation of whole cities.113 On 26 September 1915, a second ‘‘temporary law’’
was passed, without the consent of the temporarily suspended parliamentary
chambers, concerning the confiscation of (Armenian) assets. It is described by
Wandel as follows:
The new temporary law prescribes that the possessions of the deported Armenians are
to be confiscated by the public administration. According to the law . . . it will be possible
to confiscate the land belonging to all of the deported Armenians, as well as Armenian
churches and schools. It is clear that the forced sale of the property, head over heels and
under the current conditions, will not come close to covering the actual value of the
property. The liquidation commission mentioned in the law can act completely
arbitrarily. It has been given authority to annul any claims of the deported without
consulting said persons, and to hand over property to other claimants without giving
the deported any right or possibility to set aside such a decision. Any surplus generated
by the liquidation of the possessions of the deported will, after deduction of expenses, be
deposited in the ministry of finance, without any mention of when it is supposed to be
paid back to the owners. Considering that the law of 27 May 1915 has laid the legal
foundation for the great deportations of the Armenians and for the connected
persecutions, it is easy to imagine the far-reaching consequences of an arbitrary
execution of the provisions of the new law, which practically could lead to complete ruin
for the Armenians of Asia Minor.114
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The Austrian military attache´ to the Ottoman Empire, Joseph Pomiankowski, simply
stated that the law was a farce.115 Its aim was, in reality, to ‘‘legalize’’ and systematize
the widespread profiteering from the genocide by the state, officials, the army, Muslim
refugees, and local populations. In several reports Wandel mentions that the only real
high-level Turkish voice of protest against the plundering and persecution of the
Armenians came from Senator Ahmed Riza.116 This is perhaps somewhat surprising,
since the European-educated senator, formerly a leading Young Turk ideologue,
president of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, chairman of the CUP, and still a
convinced and idealistic Turkist, had earlier displayed no particular sympathy toward
the Christian minorities of the empire.117 In fact, he was early on believed to belong to
the radical wing of the Young Turks, as can be discerned from the statement of a
person present at a lecture given by Riza in London in 1904:
I am not sorry that the gentleman has spoken, because it shows us how impossible it is
to expect any reforms in Turkey from the Young Turk party. They are only thinking of
themselves. The liberties of the Christians would be just as unsafe under a Sultan with
the sentiments of the gentleman [Riza] who has just sat down, as under the present
Sultan.118
But Riza definitely felt that, during the Great War, the Young Turk government
went much too far in carrying out its oppressive policies against minorities such as the
Armenians, a minority that, in large part, lived in provinces where Christians had
never experienced justice or security, as he stated during a parliamentary debate in
1916.119 Riza’s scolding criticism of Young Turk policies could even be seen as a logical,
if unusually principled, extension of his democratic beliefs, as well as of his earlier,
equally scolding criticism of Western imperialism and racism.120 He also tried
constantly to convince his colleagues in the Ottoman senate that the laws ‘‘legalizing’’
these Young Turk policies were unconstitutional and unjust.121 Although Ahmed
Riza’s protests were obviously in vain, and although he was frequently harrassed in
Parliament by his colleagues, he did not give up on a subject that was, to him, a matter
of conscience and principle.
As late as November 1917, Riza and the three other members of his small Young
Turk parliamentary faction (Orkhan Bey, Mahmoud Pasha, and Damad Ferid Pasha)
insisted on debating in the Ottoman parliament the unlawful confiscation of what were
euphemistically called ‘‘abandoned properties’’ and the connected persecutions of
Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs. This was highly unusual during the reign of the Young
Turk dictatorship, since no real debate was allowed either in the government-
controlled press or in Parliament; when a case was brought before the parliament, it
had already been decided upon by the CUP. But Riza was occasionally allowed to speak
out without being disciplined or punished, and he even made sure that the criticism he
raised in the Senate was, to some extent, printed in the official parliamentary record.
That record was not accessible to the public, but at least some of the legations managed
to get hold of it.122 The reasons that Riza was allowed to speak out were that he, a man
of integrity and some influence as one of the founders of the CUP, was still highly
esteemed among parts of the general population and the elite, and also that, because
he lacked a proper power base, he was regarded as relatively harmless, or even useful,
by the Young Turks, as they could point to his presence in the Senate to claim that,
since there was an opposition, the empire was ruled in a truly parliamentary
fashion.123
During the Senate meeting of 29 November 1917, the government proposed a
law that would grant an official commission two million piastres to administer
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‘‘the preservation of the abandoned properties.’’ This seemingly innocent proposition
would, if passed, be a de facto legalization of the Temporary Law of Expropriation and
Confiscation of 1915, which allowed the government to ‘‘confiscate’’—that is, steal—
Armenian cash and property and to resell the property for profit. In the preceding two
years the government had not dared to introduce that law to the parliamentary
chambers, and the introduction of the appropriation law was thus an obvious attempt
to obtain an indirect parliamentary blessing for an unconstitutional law. Orkhan Bey
started the debate by saying exactly this: that, as the provisional or temporary law
regarding the ‘‘abandoned properties’’ had not yet been introduced to and approved by
the Senate, granting the requested two million piastres would give the appearance
that the Senate was approving a law it had not been given the opportunity to properly
debate and approve. The Senate president, without directly commenting on Orkhan
Bey’s assertions, assured him that this would not be the case.
Then Riza spoke, echoing his protests in Parliament against the ‘‘temporary law’’
two years earlier, in the fall of 1915.124 Among other things, he pointed to the fact that
the very term ‘‘abandoned properties’’ was ridiculous:
We take responsibility by accepting an expression. In my opinion the expression
‘‘abandoned properties’’ means property that has been abandoned, left behind. But no
one has left behind their property of their own free will. We must find an appropriate
expression and say straight out, ‘‘Law for the Preservation of Possessions of Armenians,
Greeks, and Arabs, who out of Political Necessity have been Removed from their
Homes.’’ The expression ‘‘abandoned properties’’ is not accurate, and the Senate should
not accept such an inaccurate expression. In reality the population has been violently
driven from their homes and been abducted by force, and their property has been left
behind. This line of action is also unconstitutional, because the constitution protects the
inviolability of property. I will go further and say that if the rights of property do not
exist in a country . . ., no government exists either . . .. The government does claim that it
has had the right to such action. Since I have yet to examine the matter in its entirety,
I cannot for the moment give a definite statement thereof. The government publishes
brochures with its viewpoints. Let us assume that every word in these brochures is
absolutely true. Some Armenians and Greeks may very well, as the government says,
have been traitors. Those you find among the Turks and the Kurds, as well as among
the Armenians. But the law establishes punishment for the traitors, the criminals. You
execute them, shoot them; but you never deport their families or rob their fortune. This
is an outright reign of terror.125
The Senate president was of the opinion that all of this could be discussed only
when the law in question, the September 1915 law, was introduced to the Senate.
But, as Riza stated once again, that law had not been introduced, and there was no
sign that this would actually happen. The Senate president also remarked that the
Senate had earlier approved the expression ‘‘abandoned properties,’’ and he thought it
strange not to accept it this year. Riza answered that he himself had not accepted it,
nor would he. He once again demanded the introduction of the confiscation law, not the
‘‘auxiliary’’ appropriation law: ‘‘We have to know that the properties are not lost, that
they remain to be given back to their rightful owners, and that these are not all dead.’’
The president said that the confiscation law had been introduced to the Chamber of
Deputies, but that it had not been read because of that chamber’s workload, and that
the Senate therefore could not blame the government. After further protests from
Riza’s group, who knew this to be a phony explanation, the law was passed. Thus,
the Senate ended up indirectly sanctioning the bill that Riza and his small group
had fought so vigorously against, the bill that indirectly ‘‘legalized’’ what was,
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according to Jesse B. Jackson, American consul to Aleppo, ‘‘a gigantic
plundering scheme as well as a final blow to extinguish the [Armenian] race.’’126
Conclusion
Space permits only an introduction to some of the most important subjects covered
by Carl Ellis Wandel in relation to the Armenian Genocide. For instance, his often
long and analytical reports also deals extensively with subjects such as the question
of ‘‘German complicity,’’ the dynamics and relationships within the Young Turk
leadership, and the official Young Turk campaign of denial and falsification of their
crimes. But the sample of documents analyzed and contextualized above should leave
the impression that even an unknown diplomat from a small country has something to
offer when it comes to explaining important aspects of one of the largest exterminatory
projects of the twentieth century. For, as Wandel convincingly argued, this was
the nature of the Armenian Genocide: it was an extremely cruel, pragmatic, and
opportunistic political and economical project, fueled by a highly xenophobic,
nationalist (proto-)ideology, all in the context of war and of a ‘‘grand scheme’’ of
radical modernization by Turkification. Contemporary official justifications of the
persecutions—‘‘military necessity,’’ Armenian ‘‘disloyalty’’ or ‘‘provocation’’—were
dismissed as exaggerated, fabricated, or simply irrelevant. Wandel concurred
with most other contemporary and later observers that the Ottoman Armenians did
not bring their fate upon themselves.
In other words, pragmatic considerations, combined with a downward spiral of
more and more radicalized rhetoric and actions, as well as the opportunity created
by a world war, were, for Wandel, essential in understanding why the anti-Armenian
policies were intended and carried out as complete destruction and not, say, ethnic
cleansing or continued oppression. To him, it was what we today would call a
twisted road to the Armenian Genocide, which is probably why he did not attempt to
estimate the exact time of the conception of a Young Turk plan of actual genocide. This
does not mean that Wandel was taking sides, in 1915 and 1916, in a debate of
‘‘intentionalists’’ versus ‘‘functionalists,’’ as such a debate obviously did not exist at the
time. If it had, it would most likely not have seemed to be of even academic interest to
an eyewitness, in the face of the ongoing slaughter. Wandel simply reported on what
he saw, heard, and read, as the often seemingly chaotic events progressed, and he
came to conclusions about important aspects of the nature of the Armenian Genocide
that are quite similar to conclusions many (but not all) contemporary observers, as
well as many present-day scholars (myself included), have come to on the basis of
available evidence.
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